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PREPARING FOR THE WORST:
RE-ENVISIONING DISASTER LEGAL RELIEF
IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Martha F. Davis*
INTRODUCTION
The New York legal community's response to the September
11th disaster defies the usual stereotypes of the legal profession.
Ambulance chasers and sharks were in short supply. Instead, in
the weeks and months following the World Trade Center attacks,
New York's bar channeled an unprecedented outpouring of sup-
port into uncompensated pro bono efforts on behalf of victims and
their families. While pro bono assistance was available to all vic-
tims, special attention was given to matters facing needy individu-
als that would not generate fees.' The bar even stood behind
efforts to minimize the subsequent litigation, with the American
Trial Lawyers Association ("ATLA"), through its subsidiary Trial
Lawyers Care, offering free counseling to family members consid-
ering pursuing monetary relief through the federal Victims' Com-
pensation Fund.2
As described in Public Service in a Time of Crisis: A Report and
Retrospective on the Legal Community's Response to the Events of
September 11, 2001 (hereinafter, the ABCNY Fund Report),3 there
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. The au-
thor would like to thank David Hall and George Kocur for helpful comments. Excel-
lent research assistance was provided by Anjali Walker, Hema Sarangapani, and Sara
Pic.
1. Tort claims were not handled by pro bono attorneys. In fact, the Pro Bono
and Legal Services Committee of the City Bar prepared a draft engagement letter
that limited firms' scope of representation by excluding representation for tort claims
that might conflict with the firms' existing clients' interests. Ass'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF N.Y. FUND, INC., ET AL., PUBLIC SERVICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS: A RE-
PORT AND RETROSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 at 16, reprinted in 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 831 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter ABCNY FUND ET AL.].
2. See id. at 842; Trial Lawyers Care, Inc., Trial Lawyers Care: helping hundreds
of victims better cope with the aftermath of that horrific day, at http://www.911lawhelp.
org (last visited Apr. 24, 2004) (providing general information for lawyers seeking to
provide pro bono services). The ATLA estimates that the cost of this representation
totaled the equivalent of $360 million since 2001. See Leo V. Boyle, "ATLA Thanks
Members Who Volunteered Through Trial Lawyers Care to Represent 9/11 Victims and
Families," at www.atlanet.org/homepage/911thanks.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
3. ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1.
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is little to fault in the bar's response to the September 11th disaster.
Bar leaders worked under extreme pressure-in some instances,
having suffered losses themselves-to devise a sound approach to
assisting with others' needs. The "facilitator" model of providing
advice and representation was a sensitive and effective solution to
the problem of clients facing multiple issues and multiple lawyers
representing a single client. And literally thousands of lawyers
donated time and resources to provide legal assistance to those in
need.4 In short, the New York bar's disaster response deserves
consideration as a national model for such efforts.
At the same time, as tremendous as the bar's response was, it is
worth examining on a more systemic level the national approach to
providing legal assistance in disasters. In the current global politi-
cal climate, we can anticipate that there will be more disasters giv-
ing rise to legal needs, including attacks by domestic or
international terrorists. Given this heightened need for disaster
preparedness, efficient, non-duplicative use of legal resources is a
key issue. There is much to learn from the ABCNY Fund Report in
that regard. Nevertheless we should also consider whether there is
an even more efficient and comprehensive way to administer legal
assistance in the context of a disaster.
As reflected in the New York experience, disaster legal relief
across the United States is typically handled by private pro bono
practitioners who mobilize quickly after the disaster strikes. Con-
sidering that pro bono legal work generally serves three overlap-
ping purposes: 1) providing legal assistance to the client(s); 2)
expanding individual lawyers' visions of their role in the commu-
nity and society; and 3) raising the profession's standing with the
public 5-we should at least ask whether each of these purposes are
being best achieved by the current approach to disaster legal
services.6
4. See Trial Lawyers Care, supra note 2.
5. The legal profession is consistently ranked near the bottom in polls ranking
the trust accorded the professions. See, e.g., Polling Report.com, CNN/USA Today
Gallup Poll Nov. 14-16, 2003, at http://www.pollingreport.com/values (last visited Apr.
24, 2004). According to the poll, of 1004 adult poll participants nationwide, only six-
teen percent believed that lawyers had high or very standards of honesty and ethics.
See id. Of twenty-three professions, lawyers were ranked eighteenth with respect to
public opinion on their level of professional ethical standards with only stockbrokers,
advertising practitioners, insurance salesmen, HMO managers, and car salesmen re-
ceiving lower scores. See id.; see also DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUS-
TICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3-8 (2000).
6. These purposes are distinct from the underlying rationales that support-or
even require-that members of the legal profession undertake pro bono work. Such
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First, in terms of providing actual assistance to individuals, the
New York City bar had tremendous success in mobilizing a legal
response to the September 11th attacks. The overall numbers are
impressive. But numbers do not tell the whole story. In New York
and elsewhere, pro bono lawyers providing disaster legal services
often lack expertise in the relevant areas and may have little prior
experience with the client community affected by the disaster.
Both of these factors may affect pro bono attorneys' ability to
reach and to assist clients, even if the bar's mobilization efforts are
effective in enlisting volunteers.7 Further, New York City's experi-
ence may be sui generis. Collectively, the New York City bar has
extraordinary resources. No other community in the United States
would be able to call upon such a high level of private legal re-
sources-both in terms of numbers and caliber-in the event of a
disaster.8 Finally, while the New York bar apparently avoided de-
moralizing turf battles and the inefficiencies that accompany them,
other communities-in all likelihood, those without such extensive
resources to draw on-might not be so fortunate.9 In sum, the
New York experience was extremely positive in assisting clients,
rationales for pro bono work include the idea that lawyers owe legal services to the
public because of certain benefits they have received, such as exclusive access to the
courts or attorney-client privileges. See Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "Public
Assets" Theory of Lawyers' Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1246
(1997) (positing that because a portion of lawyers' income is directly attributable the
"lawyer-commodities" that have been provided to them by the public, the "pro bono
obligation can therefore be seen as a simple recapture of some of the profit derived
from access to this asset.")
7. To improve pro bono attorneys' effectiveness, the Legal Aid Society, Legal
Services for New York, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and
several other provider groups conducted trainings on the legal issues that pro bono
attorneys might be called on to resolve. See, e.g., THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, THE
LEGAL AID SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORT, 2002, at 21-24 (2003), available at www.legal-
aid.org/uploads/AR2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2004)
8. A study by the American Bar Association revealed that in 2003, New York
State had 137,108 resident lawyers. This number, the highest in the country, exceeded
even California, which had 134,468 resident lawyers. See Am. Bar Assoc., NATIONAL
LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE 2 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/marke-
tresearch/2002nb roflawyersbystate.pdf (last visited May 20, 2004). In terms of metro-
politan areas, in 2002, New York City ranked first absolute numbers (45,400) and
third in density of lawyers behind Washington D.C., and Tallahasee, Florida. Bureau
of Labor Stats., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Employment and Wages, 2002, at
http://www.bls.gov/oes/20 02/oes231011.htm#msa (last visited May 20, 2004).
9. The American Bar Association has acknowledged this in its own blueprint for
disaster legal services, noting that "coordinating activities ... can be a major chal-
lenge." See ABA, Bar Association Emergency Preparedness & Response Resources
Part III: Serving the Public Following a Disaster, at http://www.abanet.org/barservl
disas ter/publicassistance.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
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but it is not clear if other smaller, less resource-rich communities
would have similar success.
Second, in terms of expanding individual lawyers' vision of their
own capacities and roles in the community, the New York Bar's
mobilization efforts were clearly a short-term success. The
ABCNY Fund Report chronicles the unprecedented level of volun-
tarism from the bar in the wake of the terrorist acts. Many volun-
teer lawyers responding to a later survey described their pro bono
experiences in glowing terms.10 But now, according to the ABCNY
Fund Report, "the rush of legal volunteers has diminished." Since
the initial wave of volunteers, "it has been difficult to staff some
opportunities, especially those involving a loss of income and re-
quiring special expertise to pursue, such as workers' compensation
and landlord/tenant matters."'" The New York effort was a short-
term reaction to an immediate disaster. It did not encompass any
long-term strategy of connecting these newly motivated volunteers
with organizations that provide legal services day-in and day-out.
Through training, mentoring, and creating personal connections
between public interest lawyers and private bar volunteers, could
disaster legal relief efforts do a better job of ensuring that volun-
teer lawyers are not just one-time pro bono participants?
Finally, from the perspective of the profession's public standing,
despite all the good the bar did after September 11th, this outpour-
ing of pro bono assistance does not seem to have had a permanent
effect on the public perception of the legal profession. The legal
profession remains one of the least trusted of the professions.12 It
only takes a few counterexamples such as the tasteless ads in the
wake of the Staten Island ferry disaster13or the ethically challenged
10. See ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1, at 921. Interestingly, those who were
involved in ongoing legal work on behalf of victims-rather than smaller projects-
were more likely to be very satisfied with their pro bono experience. See id.
11. Id. at 907.
12. See LEO J. SHAPIRO & Assocs., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS CON-
SUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 34 (2002) (prepared on behalf of the ABA Sec. Litiga-
tion ), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf (last
visited May 18, 2004). According to this survey, conducted in April 2002, confidence
in lawyers received a boost post-September 11th, but lawyers retained their position
relative to other professions and, in fact, did not register as much gain as other profes-
sions in the wake of the disaster. Further, the report's authors speculate that any
boost in lawyer's ratings is temporary, and that the lower confidence ratings will re-
turn once disaster victims begin filing lawsuits. Id. The survey consisted of 450 na-
tionally representative households. Id. at 2.
13. See Susan Saulny, Lawyers' Ads Seeking Clients In Ferry Crash, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2003, at 1.
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lawyer Alan Shore on the television show The Practice,'4 to eclipse
the good work of pro bono advocates. Given the apparent intran-
sigence of the legal profession's negative image, is improving law-
yers' public image really an attainable goal of pro bono work? Or
could a different system of disaster legal services delivery better
contribute to a more sympathetic picture of the legal profession?
In this essay, I will explore whether, despite the New York bar's
inspiring model, securing more comprehensive federal support of
post-disaster legal services on the national level should be a long-
term goal of the legal profession. There are many questions, not all
of which can be answered here, that should be debated before such
a goal is adopted. But given the heightened prospects for more
disasters, we should at least start asking the questions.
For example, what would be the costs and benefits of harnessing
federal resources to provide more institutionalized legal services to
disaster victims on a national basis? Through existing legislation,
the federal government has already acknowledged that it has the
responsibility to provide legal services following a national disaster.
Yet federal funding is currently extremely narrow in scope, limited
to a tiny subsidy to offset the administrative costs of the American
Bar Association Young Lawyer Division's post-disaster pro bono
work for low income disaster victims. Given the substantial federal
support for other aspects of disaster reliefV5-and the national im-
pact of many disasters-the government's reliance on "a thousand
points of light" to provide critical legal assistance seems risky at
best. What would it cost to adopt a different model with greater
government support?
If federal support for post-disaster legal services were to in-
crease, how should those funds be administered? Rather than cre-
ate a new institution, should disaster legal services be administered
through the bureaucracy developed to administer federally funded
legal services for the poor ("Legal Services")? Certainly, legal as-
14. The Practice (ABC television series, 1997-2004).
15. See Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Security, FY
2004 Budget Fact Sheet (Oct. 1, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/p
ress-release/press release_0274.xml (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). Federal support for
disaster relief assistance for FY 2004 includes $1.8 billion for the Disaster Relief
Fund, which provides federal assistance to supplement state and local governments'
disaster response, recovery, preparedness and mitigation efforts, $484 million for
Public Health Programs, $200 million for the flood map modernization activities, $180
million for Emergency Management Performance Grants, $153 million for the Emer-
gency Food and Shelter Program, and $60 million for Urban Search and Rescue
Teams. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-90, 117 Stat. 1137 (2003).
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sistance to disaster victims is consistent with Legal Services' origi-
nal mission. At the inception of federally funded legal services in
the 1960s, Legal Services proponents anticipated that this new law-
yer corps would be at the forefront of providing efficient, client-
centered and holistic legal services to those who could not afford
representation. 16 Echoing this longstanding poverty law approach,
leaders from the City Bar and other New York City legal organiza-
tions providing disaster legal services reached a consensus that
"families should have an individual lawyer who would work with
the family on an ongoing basis and provide that family with com-
prehensive legal services, either directly or by coordinating services
through experts in specialty areas. '"17
Would greater involvement of federally funded Legal Services in
post-disaster legal relief efforts serve the profession's goals for pro
bono work? It certainly bears further consideration. On the one
hand, greater involvement of Legal Services might improve client
services, expand individual pro bono lawyers visions by connecting
them with the public interest law community, and burnish the pro-
fession's image by situating pro bono work within a more systemic
effort. At the same time, it might also place federally funded Legal
Services on a firmer political and financial footing. Re-envisioning
(and funding) Legal Services as the entity primarily responsible for
coordinating and providing legal services to victims of disaster-
ranging from the disasters of poverty and unemployment to terror-
ist attacks 8-might insulate legal services from some of the more
16. The call for national legal services arose out of, among other factors, the publi-
cation of Edgar and Jean Cahn's seminal Yale Law Journal article that advocated for
establishment of "neighborhood law offices" whose purpose would, in part, be to
make business and government more responsive to the needs of low-income commu-
nities. See Edgar Cahn & Jean Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE L.J. 1317, 1334-52 (1964).
17. ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1, at 850.
18. Interestingly, Michele Landis argues that the origin of the American welfare
state is found in contests over disaster relief in the early nineteenth century-and that
definitions of "disaster" have been used to distinguish between the morally deserving
needy and others. See Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried By Fire':
Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1978-1874, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 967, 969-70 (1998). See generally David W. Sars, Helping Hands: Aid for Natural
Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for "Ordinary Homeless", 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129
(1995-1996) (raising questions regarding differential treatment of disaster homeless
populations versus other "ordinary" homeless).
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devastating challenges to its funding and mission.19 Further, identi-
fying federally funded Legal Services as a component of the na-
tional security infrastructure set up to deal with disasters, with
strong connections to the Department of Homeland Security,
would symbolically and practically underscore the importance of
access to justice to our nation's long-term well-being.20 Legal Ser-
vices would no longer be a besieged holdover from the War on
Poverty,21 but an important, contemporary aspect of our nation's
response to disaster, including terrorism. 2
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT ROLE IN
PROVIDING POST-DISASTER LEGAL ASSISTANCE
A. A Short History of Federal Disaster Assistance
The federal government's role in providing disaster assistance
stretches back more than two centuries, with legal assistance being
added to the mix much more recently. Beginning in 1794, Con-
gress considered (and granted) requests for class-based relief from
the consequences of disaster; the particular measure considered in
19. While inflation has risen, the level of federal funding for legal services since
1980 has not.
Annual LSC Annual LSC Percentage Change
Grant Appropriation Appropriation From 1980 Dollars
Year in Actual Dollars in 2001 (Using 2001 Dollars)
1980 300,000.000 646,238,0000.0% 0.0%
1981 321,300,000 627,401,000 -2.9%
1982 241,000,000 443,290,000 -31.4%
1990 316,525,000 429,864,000 -33.5%
1995 400,000,000 465,879,000 -27.9%
1996 278,000,000 314,500,000 -51.3%
2001 329,274,000 329,274,000 -47.0%
See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, CIVIL LEGAL AID
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM IN 2003, at 4-5, available at
http://www.cl asp.org/DMS/Documents/1064583480.94/LegalAid-2003.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 21, 2004).
20. This was the original rationale for Legal Aid put forward by Reginald Heber
Smith. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 5 (Arno Press & N.Y.
Times 1971) (1919).
21. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
22. In this article, I address only funding directed to low income victims of disas-
ters. Funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as little as it is, is
currently limited to assisting low income people, as is the federal funding provided to
Legal Services. Arguably, the federal support for disaster legal services should be
extended to all victims, at least in the initial stages following a disaster. This broader
provision of legal services could also be administered through Legal Services. But
because such a broad disaster legal services program serving all income groups could
dilute Legal Services' mission of serving the poor, it would have to be carefully
crafted.
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that year sought indemnification from the United States "to all
such citizens.., whose property may have been captured, and con-
fiscated under the authority of Great Britain. ' 23 One of the earli-
est federal responses to a natural disaster was the Congressional
Act of 1803, which provided financial assistance to a New Hamp-
shire town following an extensive fire.24
For many years, the federal government continued responding to
disasters, whether natural or man-made, on a piecemeal basis. In
the nineteenth century, Congress enacted hundreds of pieces of ad
hoc legislation in response to hurricanes, floods, and other disas-
ters. Though disasters were dealt with on a case-by-case basis, the
aggregate amounts involved were significant: for example, in 1817,
when Congress was still dealing with the aftermath of the War of
1812, relief appropriations constituted more than ten percent of the
federal budget.25
The federal government developed a bureaucracy to serve as a
clearinghouse for these funds.2 6 It was not until the 1930s, how-
ever, that the federal response to natural disasters was finally insti-
tutionalized through a permanent, though still somewhat
fragmented, approach of assigning responsibility for particular
types of disasters to appropriate agencies. For example, the Bu-
reau of Public Roads provided funding when highways and bridges
were damaged by natural disasters.27 The Flood Control Act of
193628 addressed the impact of floods.29 The Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for
repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an
earthquake, and later, other types of disasters.30
23. Landis, supra note 18, at 982.
24. See Victoria Sutton, Biodefense: Who's In Charge?, HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L.-
MED., Winter 2003, at 117, 135. About ten years earlier, the federal government had
provided relief when drought destroyed Native American crops, an act cited by some
as the first instance of federal disaster relief. See GAINES M. FOSTER, THE DEMANDS
OF HUMANITY: ARMY MEDICAL DISASTER RELIEF 8 (1983).
25. Landis, supra note 18, at 982.
26. Id. at 983.
27. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA History (2003), at http://www.fem
a.gov/about/history.shtm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004) ("In 1934, the Bureau of Public
Roads was given authority to provide funding for highways and bridges damaged by
natural disasters.") .
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 701a-709b (2004).
29. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of
Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 325 (2003).
30. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation ("RFC") was a U.S. government
agency, created in 1932 by the administration of Herbert Hoover. Its purpose was to
facilitate economic activity by lending money during the Great Depression. After its
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The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act of
197431 further spells out the federal role for disaster relief in those
instances in which the President has declared a national disaster or
emergency. Among other things, the Stafford Act provides for fed-
eral grants to states toward certain emergency costs, cash and hous-
ing assistance, and emergency preparedness planning.
These functions and the myriad agencies engaged in disaster re-
lief were finally consolidated on the federal level in 1979 when
President Carter issued an Executive Order establishing the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA").32 FEMA coor-
dinates all assistance provided directly by the federal government
in response to declared disasters and emergencies. Though often
identified in the public's mind with natural disasters, FEMA's re-
sponsibilities have always included civil defense.33 Indeed, the first
director of FEMA, John Macy, frequently emphasized the similari-
ties between natural hazards preparedness and civil defense activi-
ties-a parallel hearkening back to the origins of disaster relief in
the late eighteenth century.34 Under Macy's direction, FEMA be-
gan development of an Integrated Emergency Management Sys-
tem with an all-hazards approach that included "direction, control
and warning systems which are common to the full range of emer-
gencies from small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency-
war.,35
The World Trade Center attacks of September 11th further fo-
cused the agency on issues of national preparedness and homeland
security. In March 2003, FEMA joined twenty-two other federal
agencies, programs and offices to constitute the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS").36 FEMA is now one of four major
branches of DHS, with about 2,500 full-time employees in the
scope was greatly widened by the New Deal administration, it financed the construc-
tion and operation of war plants, made loans to foreign governments, provided pro-
tection against war and disaster damages, and engaged in numerous other activities.
By the time it was totally disbanded in 1957, the RFC had made loans of approxi-
mately $50 billion since its creation in 1932. See JESSE H. JONES, FIF-ry BILLION DOL-
LARS 3-12 (1951).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2003).
32. Exec. Order No. 12148 (1979), available at http://www.fema.go v/library!
eo1214 8.shtm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
33. See id.
34. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
35. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra 27.
36. See 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2003).
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Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, supple-
mented by more than 5,000 stand-by disaster reservists.37
B. Federal Disaster Legal Services
The Stafford Act governs the scope of federal governmental as-
sistance to be made available to states in the event of a disaster. In
general, the federal govermnent shall assist states and local govern-
ments by "providing federal assistance programs for both public
and private losses sustained in disasters. 38
The Stafford Act also codifies legal services' place in the federal
disaster relief scheme. According to the Act:
Whenever the President determines that low-income individuals
are unable to secure legal services adequate to meet their needs
as a consequence of a major disaster, consistent with the goals of
the programs authorized by this Chapter, the President shall as-
sure that such programs are conducted with the advice and assis-
tance of appropriate Federal agencies and State and local bar
associations.39
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Stafford Act reveals
little about Congress's vision of how this provision might be
implemented.
The federal regulations, however, provide some specificity-
though the regulatory language stands in tension with the plain
statutory language. According to 44 CFR § 206.164(a), "[l]egal
services, including legal advice, counseling, and representation in
non fee-generating cases... may be provided to low-income indi-
viduals who require them as a result of a major disaster."40 Fee-
generating cases are defined as those cases that would attract a pri-
vate lawyer.41 The regulations also contemplate that legal services
may be provided by "volunteer lawyers," "Federal lawyers," or
"private lawyers who may be paid by the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency. 412
To date, FEMA has implemented this provision using volunteer
lawyers, recruited through a contract entered into with the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Young Lawyer's Division ("YLD"). The al-
37. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Who We Are (2004), at http://www.fem
a.gov/about/who.shtm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(6).(2003).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2003) (emphasis added).
40. 44 C.F.R. § 206.164(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
41. 44 C.F.R. § 206.164(b).
42. 44 C.F.R. § 206.164(c).
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liance between FEMA and YLD was inspired by the organized
bar's response to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Camille in
1969. 43 The original agreement between the two entities was
signed in 1978.44 Under the most recent iteration of this contract,
signed in 1993, the YLD undertakes to "activate State and local
attorneys to provide free legal services to disaster victims. ' 45 This
is FEMA's only involvement in providing disaster legal services,
raising some question as to whether such a purely volunteer-driven
program meets the Stafford Act's requirement that the President
"shall assure that such programs are conducted" whenever low in-
come individuals cannot otherwise obtain adequate assistance in
meeting their post-disaster legal needs.46
According to the FEMA-YLD contract, "[s]hould FEMA re-
quest the assistance of the YLD, the YLD shall, with the assistance
and oversight of FEMA, have sole and complete responsibility for
coordinating legal efforts with all other State and local bar associa-
tions, affiliates and legal services organizations. ' 47 Consistent with
the restrictions found in the Stafford Act regulations, volunteer
lawyers acting under the FEMA-YLD agreement are prohibited
from handling any "fee-generating" cases that arise from the disas-
ter. The volunteer lawyers are generally called on to provide assis-
tance in areas such as insurance claims, repair contracts, the
replacement of lost documents, mortgage foreclosures, and land-
lord-tenant problems. Under the federal statute and regulations,
as well as the terms of the FEMA-YLD contract, representation is
limited to low income individuals.48
In exchange for the YLD's enlistment of pro bono lawyers to
provide free disaster legal services, FEMA covers the administra-
tive costs of coordinating the pro bono legal assistance. 49 These
43. Stephanie Francis Ward, Preparing for After the Disaster, ABA J. E-REPORT
(Oct. 31, 2003), available at WL 2 No. 43 ABAJEREP 4.
44. Id.
45. Agreement Between the American Bar Association on Behalf of its Young
Lawyers Division and Office of Disaster Assistance Programs Federal Emergency
Management Agency Concerning Disaster Legal Services 2 (July 13, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter FEMA-YLD Agreement].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2003)
47. FEMA-YLD Agreement, supra note 45, at 2.
48. As set out in the YLD's Disaster Legal Services Hotline Manual developed for
staffing the Disaster Legal Services Hotline for FEMA Major Declared Disaster No.
1498 (California wildfires): "[f]or purposes of DLS, a victim is a low-income individ-
ual if the victim has insufficient resources to secure adequate legal services, whether
the insufficiency existed prior to or results from the disaster." ABA YOUNG LAWYERS
Div., DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES HOTLINE MANUAL 1 (2003) [hereinafter MANUAL].
49. See FEMA-YLD Agreement, supra note 45, at 3.
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costs are minimal. For example, the FEMA contract with YLD to
provide post-September 11th services in the New York City metro-
politan area cost $2,010, in part because many of the costs were
absorbed by the volunteering lawyers and their firms.50 Generally,
FEMA allocates a capped amount of $5,000 in administrative costs
to each disaster.5 1 According to Rani Newman Mathura, the Con-
necticut attorney who coordinated the post-September 11th New
York program and now chairs YLD's disaster relief efforts nation-
wide, most of the money for the post-September 11th effort was
spent setting up phone lines for a hot line.5 2 Because of the exten-
sive damage to the communications systems in New York City, the
actual hotline was set up in Connecticut. With FEMA covering
these minimal start-up costs, the YLD mobilized 150 private attor-
neys, paralegals, and law students to staff the hot line for nine
hours a day for five months following the disaster, with voicemail
service available at other times. A total of 1,017 individuals re-
ceived services over the hotline, with hundreds more who did not
qualify for FEMA-YLD assistance referred to various bar
associations.53
There is no doubt that, like other forms of pro bono work, disas-
ter relief assistance is tremendously rewarding on a personal
level.54 Further, it is clear that the YLD strives to provide high
quality legal services. In the twenty-five years since the original
contract was signed with FEMA, many members of the YLD have
gained expertise in providing disaster legal services. Materials and
procedures developed by individual chapters are often shared with
50. Telephone Interview with Ken Curtin, FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaison (Oct.
7, 2003).
51. Telephone Interview with Rani Newman Mathura, ABA Young Lawyers Div.
Coordinator of Disaster Legal Services (Oct. 23, 2003).
52. Id.
53. Memorandum from Susan M. Winick & Fennemore Craig, to Gloria Rodri-
guez, FEMA, et al. (Mar. 13, 2002) (regarding Final Disaster Legal Services Report
for 9/11 Hotline) (on file with author).
54. For example, Tracy Giles, former chair of the ABA/YLD Disaster Legal Ser-
vices Committee (also known as the "Master of Disaster"), volunteered to provide
disaster legal services because his own family's history. His grandfather, a poor share-
cropper in Virginia, suffered through a series of devastating tornadoes shortly after he
scraped up enough money to finally purchase his own land. Without any legal assis-
tance to handle insurance claims and other matters, the family lost everything and
Giles's father was forced to forego college. Giles derived great satisfaction from pro-
viding legal help that, had his own family received it, might have changed their
destiny. See Monique Branscombe, Good Samaritans: Lawyers Who Give Lawyers a
Good Name, AFFILIATE (Jan. 29, 1997), at http://www.abanet.o rg/yld/affiliate/jan97/
22-3branscomb.html (last visited May 3, 2004).
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others facing new disasters.5 ' The internet greatly facilitates such
sharing of expertise. 6 Despite these strengths, however, there are
some significant drawbacks inherent in the system that FEMA and
YLD have put into place for delivering disaster legal services to
low income people.
First, providing continuity and retaining expertise are significant
issues for the YLD. The YLD includes lawyers only up to age
thirty-six or who have practiced five years or less; 57 lawyers who
"age out" are no longer on YLD's roster of potential volunteers,
though they may be targeted as ABA members. Further, YLD's
volunteer lawyers are typically drawn from a wide range of special-
ties and often do not have any background in the areas of law per-
tinent to disaster legal services.5 8 As the YLD Disaster Legal
Services Hotline Manual states, "[i]t is not unusual for participat-
ing attorneys not to be experts in the particular areas on which
they are being consulted. ' 59 In New York, the hotline volunteers
received manuals and information sheets on how to deal with vari-
ous legal matters, but as the ABCNY Fund Report intimates, there
is no substitute for real in-depth expertise in the particular area.
Second, as a voluntary organization, YLD cannot promise full
coverage around the country.6" To date, YLD coordinators have
55. For instance, after September 11th, the State Bar of California "provided its
Disaster Legal Services expertise to New York law offices." See ABA Div. For Bar
Servs., Bar Association Activities, at http://www.abanet.org/barserv/disaster/bar-
responses.html (last visited Apr. 24). Similarly, the Florida Bar provided "advice and
counsel based on Florida's experience after Hurricane Andrew." Id. The President of
the Oklahoma Bar Association ("OBA") wrote to members of the New York Bar
that:
[I]f you would like, I will be very happy to provide information regarding
our experience and our successful OBA Disaster Relief plan. Moreover, we
extend an offer to have experienced members of our committee communi-
cate directly with your bar association's representatives on what we faced
and what seemed to work for us.
Id.
56. The New York bar also used this resource. As the ABCNY Fund Report de-
scribes, the ProBono.net website was a source of critical information for New York
City volunteers seeking resources that would assist them in providing representation
to victims. See ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1, at 861-63.
57. ABA Young Lawyers Div., Membership, at http://www.abanet.org/yld/
about.html (last visited May 3, 2004).
58. See ABA Young Lawyers Div., Service to the Public, available at http://
www.abanet.org/yld/publicservice.html (last visited May 3, 2004).
59. MANUAL, supra note 48, at 4.
60. The YLD boasts more than 140,000 members. ABA, Profile Of The American
Bar Association (August 2003), at http://www.abanews.org/profile.html (last visited
May 5, 2004), but membership is automatic when a lawyer under age 36 or practicing
less than five years joins the ABA. See ABA Young Lawyers Div., supra note 57. A
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provided disaster relief services even in those jurisdictions without
active YLD chapters, relying on ABA members for assistance. For
example, in 1995, when Hurricane Marilyn struck the Virgin Is-
lands, the YLD affiliate had not yet set up any emergency relief
programs. Instead, the YLD Disaster Committee chair flew to St.
Thomas and, "by going door to door and running advertisements in
the local paper," was able to recruit volunteer attorneys to assist
residents with legal problems in the wake of the disaster.61 But in
rural areas or other sites without active ABA chapters, relying on
YLD's contacts may not yield adequate assistance. A recent effort
to mobilize lawyers to respond to California's wildfire disasters, for
instance, initially yielded only twelve lawyers to handle hotline
calls.62
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, YLD attorneys acting
under the FEMA contract cannot provide full, unfettered repre-
sentation or even advice. FEMA purports to contractually limit
the legal advice that YLD attorneys can provide. In addition to
restrictions on income and limitations on accepting fee-generating
cases, the FEMA-YLD contract states that "[w]hile operating
under this Agreement, participating attorneys may not initiate, or
counsel a disaster victim to initiate litigation against the Federal,
State, or local Governments, with respect to obtaining disaster as-
sistance. 63 The Disaster Legal Services Hotline Manual expands
on this prohibition, stating that "[b]ecause DLS [Disaster Legal
Services] is a FEMA-sponsored program, attorneys cannot advise
disaster survivors about how to bring lawsuits against the govern-
ment or initiate a lawsuit against the government to obtain disaster
assistance. ' 64 Indeed, the restriction extends even further, barring
YLD lawyers from providing pro bono representation in an admin-
istrative appeal of a FEMA claims decision.65 Notably, not only
are YLD lawyers forbidden from providing representation against
the government, they are forbidden from even giving a hotline
caller preliminary guidance on the issue. In particular, the Hotline
Manual instructs lawyers that if a caller seeks information on suing
much smaller number of YLD members are actively involved in the division. See Am.
Bar Assoc., Profile of the American Bar Association (Jan. 2004), at http://abanews.org/
profile.html (last visited May 19, 2004).
61. See Susan Fahey Desmond, Are You Prepared for Disaster?, AFFILIATE (Nov.
1995), at http://www.abanet.org/yld/desmond.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
62. Ward, supra note 43.
63. FEMA-YLD Agreement, supra note 45.
64. MANUAL, supra note 48, at 4.
65. Id. at 8.
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the government, "you must immediately disclose that you cannot
provide assistance or advice on this subject. You should then im-
mediately provide the caller with the State Bar Lawyer Referral
Service phone number.., and terminate the call."66
In New York City, these drawbacks to the FEMA-YLD arrange-
ment did not have a significant impact since nearly 4,000 attorneys
volunteered outside of the FEMA-YLD framework to provide as-
sistance through City Bar channels alone.67 Further, New York
City has two substantial legal organizations devoted to providing
direct civil legal services to the poor, the Legal Aid Society and
Legal Services for New York ("LSNY"), along with many smaller,
more specialized legal organizations, such as inMotion and the
New York Legal Assistance Group ("NYLAG"), that provide ser-
vices to low income clients.68 Compared to these resources and
expertise, the FEMA hotline was a drop in the bucket. Moreover,
in New York City, private, unrestricted funds, either from the vol-
unteer lawyers' own firms or from outside philanthropic sources,
were available to support pro bono lawyers in bringing a full range
of claims on behalf of victims. The FEMA restrictions, while per-
haps frustrating for clients who initiated calls to the FEMA-YLD
hotline, would not likely have prevented an individual claimant in
New York City from challenging a government decision.
In settings with fewer legal resources than New York, however,
YLD lawyers play a much more central role in providing disaster
legal advice to low income people. Given the limitations of the
FEMA-YLD arrangement outlined above, and the central impor-
tance of legal assistance to full recovery from disaster, another ap-
proach might be more effective. While it presents drawbacks of its
own, funding existing Legal Services offices to coordinate disaster
66. Id. at 4. This contractual restriction is of doubtful constitutionality in the wake
of Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). That case successfully chal-
lenged restrictions on federally-funded legal services that barred legal services law-
yers from advising clients concerning legal issues arising from welfare reform. See
Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 561. Like the law challenged in Legal Servs. Corp., the
restriction imposed by FEMA significantly restricts free speech by attempting to insu-
late the government's own laws from challenge.
67. See E. Leo Milonas, Holistic Approach Makes Experience Complete, N.Y. L.J,
May 1, 2003, at 8. Milonas is the president of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. See id.
68. InMotion specializes in representing low income battered women. See InMo-
tion, Our Mission, at http://www.inmotion.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). NYLAG
provides a broader range of legal services including representation on Medicaid,
Medicare, and Social Security issues. New York Legal Assistance Group, About the
New York Legal Assistance Group, at http://nylag.org/profile/about-nylag.htm (last
visited Apr. 26, 2004).
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legal relief efforts for low income people might be one such
approach.
II. FEDERALLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES
Predating disaster legal services by a decade, the federal govern-
ment has provided financial support for Legal Services to the poor
since 1966.69 The Legal Services initiative was conceived as part of
the larger federal War on Poverty that included community social
service centers, Head Start and many other social service pro-
grams.7" Legal Services, however, is built on a long history of legal
aid to the poor dating back to the turn of the century and, in some
communities, even earlier. Those legal aid programs were typically
funded through private channels, supported through organized bar
contributions and pro bono efforts of elite lawyers.71
In the 1960s, proponents of a new federally-funded Legal Ser-
vices program successfully argued that privately-funded legal aid
efforts were circumscribed by the bar's own interests-and thus
could not engage in the aggressive litigation to achieve social
change that the War on Poverty demanded. As they posited, fed-
eral funding was necessary to provide Legal Services lawyers with
the freedom and neutrality necessary to really resolve their clients'
problems, and indeed, to challenge poverty itself.72 The effect of
this new freedom was dramatic. For the first time, poor people's
lawyers began taking cases to higher courts and bringing class ac-
tions intended to create systemic changes to benefit their clients.
73
At the same time, storefront Legal Services offices provided direct
69. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 88 (2d. ed. 1978).
70. See id. at 39-43.
71. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 11-19 (1993).
72. Federally funded legal services began in 1966 as a program of the newly cre-
ated Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO"). As Johnson recounts in Justice and
Reform, OEO's Legal Services Program adopted "law reform" as its primary goal and
endeavored to use the law to achieve social change. JOHNSON, supra note 69, at 132.
Some advocates anticipated that the advent of Legal Services would serve to educate
and involve the rest of the profession in addressing poverty issues. See Russell G.
Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the
Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 381, 417-19 (2001). Professor Pearce, however, argues that the development of
the public interest bar, based in the newly created Legal Services offices of the 1960s,
undermined the previous view that the elite lawyers were the "governing class,"
charged with responsibility for the public good. See id. at 418.
73. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 8-11 (1990).
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services to individuals seeking assistance with matters ranging from
housing to child custody.7 4 Though never supported at a level that
would permit a comprehensive effort, federally funded Legal Ser-
vices has made a significant impact on the legal rights of poor peo-
ple in America.
Since 1974, federally funded Legal Services has been adminis-
tered through the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), an inde-
pendent federal agency.75 The LSC's ostensible independence,
however, has not resolved the longstanding controversy surround-
ing federal Legal Services. In recent years, governmental restric-
tions on the use of Legal Services funds and significant cuts to basic
funding have hobbled efforts to freely and aggressively represent
clients.76 Funding for national back-up centers that facilitated co-
ordination among legal services offices pursuing strategic litigation
and advocacy has been eliminated.77 Federal regulations bar feder-
ally funded legal services organizations from bringing class actions,
lobbying on behalf of client interests, participating in administra-
tive rulemaking or litigating on behalf of prisoners, even if the or-
ganizations use funds from other sources to support these
initiatives. 7 Legal services organizations are barred from collect-
ing attorneys' fees for successful representation.79 As a result, a
number of poor people's lawyers have "spun off" in the past dec-
ade to create small, but independent, legal organizations that raise
funds from unrestricted sources and have the freedom to bring
cases that are forbidden to grantees of Legal Services Corporation
funds.8 0
74. See JOHNSON, supra note 69, at 100.
75. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2004); Douglas S.
Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving our National Commit-
ment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 742 (1997) (purpose of
Legal Services Corporation was to insulate civil legal assistance from political
pressures).
76. See Nina Bernstein, Under Siege, Lawyers Seek New Tactics to Help Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1996, § 1, at 13.
77. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL 11 n.22 (1998), available at http://www.clasp.
org/DMS/Documents/999903354.829/civil%201egal %20assistance%20for%20the%20
21st%20century.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
78. See id. at 11.
79. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2003) (restricting representation on fee-generating cases);
45 C.F.R. § 1612.3 (2003) (restricting lobbying); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2003) (restricting
representation in class actions).
80. See, e.g., Alan Houseman, Advocacy Responses to State Budget Cuts and Re-
form Proposals, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 731, 740 (1992) (describing the use of pri-
vate funds to lobby against changes in state and national welfare policies).
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In New York, two large organizations, LSNY and the Legal Aid
Society, specialize in providing assistance with civil matters such as
housing, government benefits and low-wage work issues, as well as
other issues commonly facing the poor.81 Despite their considera-
ble expertise on issues pertinent to low income disaster victims,
neither LSNY nor Legal Aid received any money from the federal
government to support expansion of their work to low income
World Trade Center victims.
LSNY is currently the only New York City recipient of LSC
funding.82 With no FEMA or other disaster relief support forth-
coming in light of the disaster, LSNY's funding to provide legal
assistance to disaster victims was provided through several private
sources such as the September 11th Fund. 3
While the Legal Aid Society also specializes in representation of
the indigent, it has refused federal funding since the restrictions on
class actions and fee-generating cases were imposed on LSC grant-
ees." Like LSNY, the Legal Aid Society received no FEMA
money to provide representation to the indigent victimized by the
terrorist attacks; the Legal Aid Society mobilized other sources of
funds to support its disaster legal relief work. 85 The Legal Aid So-
ciety, however, did receive some FEMA funds directed to repairs
of the Legal Aid building, which stands in the vicinity of the World
Trade Center site. 86
Because the Legal Aid Society secured significant private fund-
ing to allow it to respond to the events of September 11th, it was in
a position to provide some direct services to the economic victims
of the disaster. As described in the ABCNY Fund Report, senior
Legal Aid lawyers staffed the legal services table at the Disaster
Assistance Service Center at 141 Worth Street, every day from 4:00
81. This arrangement is unusual, but reflects in part the high level of private sup-
port that the New York Legal Aid Society, dating from the 1890s, continued to re-
ceive from the organized bar even after federal funds supported the creation of
LSNY's predecessor organizations in the 1960s.
82. See Legal Svcs. Corp., Map of LSC Programs, at http://www.lsc.gov/fund-
prog.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
83. ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1, at 847, 881.
84. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
85. By the end of 2002, the Legal Aid Society had received grants of $5 million to
support its disaster relief activities. Grants came from, inter alia, the Ford Founda-
tion, the Unitarian Universalists, and the New York Times Foundation. See THE LE-
GAL AID SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 4.
86. Hearing on the Federal Response of 9/11 Before the S. Comm. on Env't and
Pub. Works, 107th Cong. (2002) (Statement of Danny Greenberg, President and At-
torney in Chief, Legal Aid Society), available at 2002 WL 31151402 (F.D.C.H.).
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to 8:00 p.m. The Legal Aid lawyers' advice was invaluable because,
unlike most of the other lawyers involved in providing disaster le-
gal services, they had:
legal expertise and relevant experience in critical areas. As pov-
erty lawyers, they were familiar with the nature of the problems
faced by many economic victims at the Disaster Center. These
people needed benefits, whether public or private; they had
housing problems, with many facing eviction and rent arrears;
they had no health insurance or means of obtaining needed
medical care. The expertise of Legal Aid's staff allowed them to
be effective advocates on behalf of victims, and their experience
dealing with people in crisis enabled them to handle the chal-
lenges of the situation expertly.87
With less budgetary flexibility and fewer private dollars support-
ing its disaster relief advocacy than Legal Aid, LSNY focused its
efforts on providing direct services in its target communities and
conducting trainings of pro bono attorneys. Legal Services was not
at the center of the legal mobilization described in the Report.
This "follower" role for the only federally-funded Legal Services
program in the City is all the more remarkable because the World
Trade Center disaster resulted from international terrorist at-
tacks-by its very nature a federal concern-rather than a circum-
stance such as flooding that might be deemed more local and less
deserving of federal attention.88
III. A DIFFERENT MODEL: FEDERAL FUNDING FOR DISASTER
LEGAL SERVICES
Would the provision of legal services in the wake of the Septem-
ber 11th attacks have been different if, instead of directing an insig-
nificant subsidy to private pro bono efforts, FEMA provided
adequate funding for disaster legal services to the New York agen-
87. ABCNY FUND AT AL., supra note 1, at 877.
88. Of course, Legal Services for New York City, the only federal legal services
grantee in New York City, represented many clients affected by the September 11th
attacks, and played an important role in providing training and back-up advice to
volunteer lawyers. As the ABCNY Fund Report indicates, "[n]onprofit and legal ser-
vice organizations participated in every aspect of the legal relief effort." Id. at 845.
Without additional funding to support disaster legal services, however, and with an
active docket that pre-existed the attacks, LSNY could only redirect its efforts in a
limited way. In describing the significant contributions that LSNY attorneys made as
mentors, the Report hints at the efficiencies that might have been gained had LSNY
been in a position to more freely share its lawyers' time and expertise. See id. at 848-
52 ("Legal services organizations, such as Legal Services for New York City and New
York Legal Assistance Group, played a vital role in providing and recruiting mentors
with relevant expertise."). Id. at 852.
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cies already specializing in legal assistance to indigents? Certainly.
Greater funding of Legal Services lawyers would have enabled
them to take a larger leadership and coordinating role in providing
services to low income victims, through such means as hiring addi-
tional staff to provide services and working in closer partnership
with neophyte pro bono lawyers. Legal Services lawyers' involve-
ment would have increased the general expertise of lawyers provid-
ing assistance and ensured that the legal needs presented by clients
would be evaluated in the larger context of the community. While
pro bono lawyers would still be a vital part of such a massive assis-
tance effort, the greater involvement of Legal Services lawyers
might have built closer long-term ties between the public interest
legal community and the pro bono attorneys who volunteered in
the wake of September lth.89 Further, Legal Services organiza-
tions would have been well-positioned to provide "holistic" assis-
tance in a wide range of areas, using existing funding to address
clients' legal issues that pre-dated the disaster as well as new fund-
ing to address those problems caused or exacerbated by the World
Trade Center attacks.
As it was, because of the unprecedented level of private philan-
thropic funds available in the wake of September 11th, LSNY's and
Legal Aid's efforts were well-supported even without FEMA
funds. In fact, private funds directed to legal services organizations
were preferable in some ways to government sources-and even to
private bar pro bono efforts-since these funds came without re-
strictions on representation. As described above, pro bono law-
yers' representation was often circumscribed by potential conflicts
of interest. The use of FEMA funds for legal assistance was also
significantly limited by the terms of the FEMA-YLD contract.
But New York is unique. It is more pertinent to ask, perhaps,
how provision of legal services to low income disaster victims
might be different in less resource-rich areas experiencing disasters
such as the California wildfire areas, Mississippi floods, or
Oklahoma City bombings, if FEMA adequately funded Legal Ser-
vices organizations to provide disaster legal services. Disaster vic-
tims in these areas currently receive from the government, at most,
access to a hotline and consultation with an attorney, paralegal or
law student who must terminate the conversation if the possibility
of suing the government is broached. In many instances, these vic-
89. Assuming that FEMA funds were limited to disaster legal services to the poor,
the organized Bar would still play a key, independent role in providing advice and
referrals to disaster victims who did not qualify as low income.
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tims remain vulnerable to the same legal "sharks"-or "disaster
gypsies"-who moved so quickly to solicit clients after the Staten
Island ferry disaster. Were the 179 Legal Services organizations
around the country funded to provide disaster legal services to low
income victims, coverage would certainly be significantly more
seamless than it is under the FEMA-YLD contract.
In fact, the benefits of such a Legal Services-centered system
would be significant, particularly from the client's perspective:
they could expect lawyers with pertinent expertise and experience
in the relevant communities; readily-available, on-the-ground insti-
tutional support; and long-term commitment to the issues and the
community that transcend the immediate disaster. But there are
also downsides: 1) the possible loss of broad participation by vol-
unteer attorneys, along with the attendant personal and profes-
sional benefits of pro bono efforts; 2) with greater government
funding, the potential for more dramatic governmental restrictions
designed to control advice and representation; and 3) the possibil-
ity that disaster legal services might overwhelm the fundamental
mission of federally funded legal services. Each of these potential
drawbacks are discussed below.
First, if federal funding for disaster legal services wholly eclipsed
individual pro bono efforts, the profession would definitely be the
worse for it. That need not be the case, however. With greater
funding, Legal Services lawyers can provide greater leadership in
providing disaster legal services by conducting training sessions,
creating mentoring relationships, or supervising pro bono counsel
while still involving volunteer attorneys in all aspects of the repre-
sentation. The personal rewards of pro bono work will still be
available-and indeed, might be even greater because of the in-
creased opportunities to work closely with, and learn from, public
interest lawyers. Further, the role of pro bono in shoring up the
profession's image would not be undermined. Several surveys indi-
cate that public interest lawyers generally enjoy greater public trust
and support than do lawyers at large. 90 Situating disaster legal ser-
vices as an effort of full-time public interest lawyers, supported
fully by public-spirited private lawyers acting pro bono, will more
90. In the ABA's April 2002 survey of the public's perception of lawyers, sixty-
three percent of those surveyed rated it important that lawyers engage in community
service work and pro bono cases in order to improve the public's perception. See LEO
J. SHAPIRO & Assocs., supra note 12, at 37. Participants generally held negative
views on lawyers, reserving their neutral or positive reactions only for real estate and
public interest lawyers. Id. at 16.
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likely than not enhance the profession's reputation. It clearly can't
hurt.
Second, LSC's experience with governmental restrictions clearly
underscores the danger of federal funding. The particular restric-
tions currently imposed on FEMA funds, however, barring suits
against the government-including administrative appeals of agen-
cies' benefits decisions 91-would not likely survive a legal chal-
lenge in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Legal Service
Corporation vs. Velazquez.92 Like the restrictions challenged
there, the limitations on representation imposed on YLD lawyers
as recipients of FEMA funding constitute viewpoint-specific condi-
tions that violate the First Amendment. 93 On a broader note, be-
cause the poor deserve full and fair legal representation, it is
important to continue defending government-funded legal services
against these sorts of restrictions. Beating a retreat, and substitut-
ing private pro bono representation and voluntarism for federally
funded Legal Services, will serve neither the profession nor clients
in the long run. The fact that the possibility of federal funding for
disaster legal services has not been more forcefully raised unfortu-
nately speaks to the effectiveness of years of attacks on federally
funded Legal Services.
Finally, would responsibility for disaster legal services over-
whelm LSC-funded organizations? The argument might go as fol-
lows: day-to-day, Legal Services offices simply are not staffed-up to
the necessary levels to undertake legal representation of all low
income disaster victims. More importantly, disaster legal services
are far outside the scope of legal services' mission of using law to
promote social change and social integration of the poor. If disas-
ter is added to Legal Services' portfolio, these offices will simply
become routine service centers rather than organizations providing
their communities with strategic counsel as well as daily
representation.
The response to this legitimate concern is twofold. Initially, as
set out above,94 giving Legal Services lawyers responsibility for
providing and coordinating disaster relief activities should not im-
ply that no other lawyers would participate. Indeed, only a truly
inefficient system would ignore the availability of volunteer legal
assistance and mandate exclusive Legal Services staff attorney rep-
91. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
92. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
93. See supra note 66.
94. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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resentation. Rather, additional federal funds would allow Legal
Services offices to increase or reallocate staff, at least temporarily,
to provide additional disaster services, including administration
and coordination, but not to supplant all pro bono efforts. Consis-
tent with current Legal Services efforts to involve pro bono coun-
sel, each Legal Services office might include a disaster legal
services coordinator to oversee the pro bono efforts of lawyers. By
linking these pro bono efforts directly to federally funded Legal
Services, an institution with a long-term commitment to providing
legal assistance in the affected community, new volunteers might
gain connections that would enable them to continue their legal
volunteerism long after the disaster receded.
Moreover, LSC's strategic mission need not be compromised-
in fact, it would be furthered if Legal Services lawyers receive
funding to assist a wider range of the poor in their communities.
To ensure that resources are allocated properly, routine procedures
could be delegated to trained pro bono attorneys or paralegals
under the supervision of Legal Services lawyers, leaving exper-
iences staff to attend to more complex or lime-consuming tasks.
Legal services lawyers would then be able to bring their expertise
to bear on the area of disaster relief for the poor in the same way
that they have successfully analyzed public benefits delivery, hous-
ing laws, family law and health law. The areas are conceptually
and practically closely linked.95 Such continuity of legal services
could create some important synergies that would inure to clients'
immediate benefit and would improve disaster relief systems
overall.
CONCLUSION
Given the existence of substantial, well-coordinated pro bono ef-
forts in this area, increasing federal funding for disaster legal ser-
vices is a long-term project. But even though it is not pressing,
such a shift would yield definite advantages to both the profession
and to disaster victims. Private attorneys seeking to dispel the im-
age of "sharks in a feeding frenzy" would benefit from the close
association with legal services for the poor. Legal services organi-
zations would benefit from the association between their work and
the disaster relief efforts of the Department of Homeland Security.
And clients would gain access to greater legal expertise in relevant
areas and more continuity in representation.
95. See Landis, supra note 18, at 971.
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How much would it cost? As it stands, FEMA is benefiting from
an essentially free arrangement with the ABA-YLD. Funding le-
gal services organizations to provide disaster legal services will def-
initely cost more, though economies of scale will help keep costs
down. For example, accessible federally funded Legal Services of-
fices are already present in many communities, and many have al-
ready established outreach mechanisms such as hotlines.
The current annual congressional budget for the LSC is a bare
minimum of $336.6 million.96 Most Legal Services organizations
supplement these funds with other grants from states and private
sources. 97 The best course might be to create a pilot program to
explore federal funding of disaster legal assistance: increase the
federal Legal Services budget by, say, ten percent in the next
budget negotiation with funds appropriated from the Homeland
Security budget and designate the increase on an experimental ba-
sis to fund certain Legal Services offices in providing disaster legal
relief. The Legal Aid Society received more than $5 million in pri-
vate funds supporting its disaster relief efforts in the case of a ma-
jor disaster; the ten percent budget increase might permit
experimentation by five to fifteen Legal Services offices in adminis-
tering disaster legal services responses to disasters small and large.
The intention at this initial stage would not be to provide compre-
hensive disaster legal services, but to begin establishing reasonable
budget parameters for providing necessary services. Given the ex-
isting language of the Stafford Act permitting such an arrangement
for provision of disaster legal services, no Congressional involve-
ment would be necessary, aside from budgeting additional Home-
land Security funds to cover the pilot program.
As FEMA has found, disasters are not wholly predictable, and
there will have to be some flexibility in any budget. But especially
after September 11th, we can predict with some certainty that more
disasters are in the offing. The lawyers of New York City Bar, act-
ing with courage, generosity and compassion, showed what was
possible when the unexpected occurred. By better utilizing the ex-
pertise available through federally funded Legal Services, we can
be even better prepared next time.
96. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Div. B tit.
V, 117 Stat. 96 (2003).
97. See, e.g., Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., Foundation Support for Neigh-
borhood Legal Services, at http://www.nls.org/foundation.htm (last visited May 20,
2004) (listing non-LSC donors to the Buffalo, New York-based Legal Services office).
